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In recent years，investment has always been considered as the key factor of sti-
mulating economic growth in China，which is leaded by investment in enterprises. 
Constrained by many factors in reality, the input-output can never reach the optimum 
levels under ideal conditions, much less unsustainable rapid expansion, following suit 
of investment and repeated construction. Gradually, over-investment has become uni-
versal. Over-investment can reduce the allocative efficiency of capital, wastes limited 
economic resources, makes a big influence on the operational risk, condition of assets, 
cash flow and future earnings, which even can imperils enterprises’existence. So, re-
stricting over-investment is in urgent need to be resolved to realize value maximiza-
tion. 
In view of high demand for investment, the research empirically tests the associ-
ation between the deviation extent of shareholders’ control right and over-investment, 
which object is private listed companies on A share market in China between the year 
of 2003 and 2010. Furthermore, the ownership structure of listed companies is re-
measured in this paper by Shapley—Shubik power indices based on the Oceanic 
Games. We use super efficiency approach for data envelopment analysis, which not 
only define the optimal boundary for investment and obtain each private listed com-
pany’s over-investment level but also evaluate different efficiency of investment on 
the same boundary, to measure over-investment of listed companies, providing further 
date support for investment for private listed companies in China. Empirical results 
show that level of over-investment has a significant positive association with the dev-
iation extent of shareholders’ control right, and the positive association is attenuated 
for firms with well legal environment and external audit of high quality, which offers 
further empirical evidence for the association between over-investment and the own-
ership structure. 
The following refers to the logic of this paper. The essence of modern enterprise 
system is the separation of ownership and control. Wider dispersion of stock owner-













highlights the agency problem between shareholders and managers. With the funda-
mental interest conflicts, managers are prone to accept the suboptimal investment op-
portunity for value maximization to seek personal gain, such as perquisite consump-
tions. As kinds of external monitoring mechanisms for listed firms, legal environment 
and external audit can relieve the agent costs between shareholders and managers, 
thus attune the over-investment caused by dispersion of stock control right. 
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